The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has topped a national poll for the first time, prompting the popular Bild newspaper to carry the headline: “AfD breaks the magic barrier”. The poll put the AfD on 26% and the Christian democratic CDU/CSU on 25%.
This is just one opinion poll, but since February’s early federal election, the direction of travel has been clear. Governments sometimes become unpopular mid-term, but Germany isn’t mid-term. The federal election was just two months ago, and the new government hasn’t yet been formed (this routinely takes months in Germany). Nor has CDU leader Friedrich Merz become chancellor; the date pencilled in for that is May 6.
So these clear polling shifts (with the CDU/CSU down about 3% on the federal election, the AfD up about 5%) are striking. They owe little to any finesse by the party that has taken the lead, the AfD, and much more to the unusual circumstances in which Germany’s mainstream parties have found themselves. They also pose a salutary warning about possible future developments.
Following the recent election, the AfD has a record 152 parliamentarians and is currently embroiled in an argument about whether, given its expanded size, it can take over a meeting room currently occupied by the SPD – a sensitive topic as it is named after Otto Wels, a social democrat who opposed Hitler’s seizure of power.
So far, its approach has been to attack the political mainstream it brands “cartel parties”. In the new Bundestag’s first meeting, the AfD’s Stephan Brandner took to insulting other parties (the SPD and Greens were “political dwarf Germans”, mainstream parties were “lying” and “cheating”). None of this seems likely to have driven the party’s poll surge – although the AfD does find some traction when accusing Merz of betraying conservative voters.
What has, however, affected the polls is Merz himself. The CDU leader presented himself as a fiscal hawk during the federal election campaign, but within days of his win, he performed a volte-face. He agreed to relax Germany’s constitutional restrictions on debt so defence spending above 1% of GDP would no longer be counted, likewise a new €500 billion fund for infrastructure.
The change also meant Germany’s states could also run a modest deficit. These moves owed much to pressure from the social democrat SPD – the infrastructure demand in particular was a key condition from Merz’s only possible coalition partner. But there was also a clear need to spend more on defence (given global developments) and infrastructure, with no other funds being available.
Early April’s Politbarometer poll showed just 36% thinking it “good” if Merz became chancellor (59% “not good”). On a scale of 5 to -5, respondents rate Merz -0.8. Even though the public backs the changes to debt rules he has made, there is a sense that Merz was not honest with them in the election campaign.
These poor ratings are in spite of coalition talks between CDU/CSU and SPD having gone reasonably well. Not only did they agree on the debt rule reform, but a coalition treaty is now being voted on by SPD members. The CDU will agree it at the end of the month while the Bavarian CSU has already given the green light.
It includes significant tightening of migration policy (at the outer reaches of what the SPD would agree to), some cuts to VAT and corporation tax, and nods in the direction of income tax cuts for lower and middle earners and a higher minimum wage. That said, there has already been public argument between CDU/CSU and SPD about how binding these commitments are – not a good omen for future co-operation.
Pressure on both sides
So while this poll doesn’t change the fact that Merz will almost certainly be voted in as chancellor leading a CDU/CSU coalition with the SPD, it does show that the coalition is already facing an age-old problem for “grand coalitions” between centre-left and centre-right parties.
The risk is always that they will end up strengthening support for parties to their left and right. The SPD faces a serious threat from the Greens and the resurgent Left Party amongst those who would favour a more open attitude to immigration and higher taxes for top earners, for example.
No matter how far Merz goes on immigration and tax cuts, the AfD will accuse him of betraying core conservative values and may continue to gain ground as a result. Some leading CDU politicians have suggested treating the AfD as a more “normal” opponent (for instance in allowing it to chair parliamentary committees). But that would hardly be a game-changer.
Merz’s difficulties are heightened by the global economic situation: Germans are already deeply pessimistic about economic developments, and the impacts and instability generated by US tariffs, whether implemented or potential, put the country in the eye of the storm, making the job of governing more difficult still.
A clear majority of German voters still rejects any prospect of the AfD joining the government, but they may have to get used to it being ahead in opinion polls.
Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Header image credit: AfD.
